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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Lewis v. City of Chicago1 the Supreme Court will determine 
when the statute of limitations commences for an employee filing suit 
against an employer who implements a discriminatory testing 
practice. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 (“Title VII”) 
prohibits employment practices that are intentionally discriminatory 
or have an impermissibly disparate impact—practices that, while 
neutral on their face, disproportionately affect a protected class.3 Title 
VII requires aggrieved employees to file their challenges to these 
practices with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) within 300 days of the allegedly illegal employment 
activity. Lewis gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve a 
circuit split over whether, in the context of disparate impact claims, 
the statute of limitations begins to run upon the announcement of the 
alleged discriminatory practice or upon an employer’s use of that 
practice.4 
To examine the complex issue confronting the Court, this 
Commentary proceeds in five sections. Part II discusses the facts 
presented in Lewis. Part III explores the legal background influencing 
the Seventh Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s ruling. Part IV 
explains the Seventh Circuit’s disposition of the case based on its 
interpretation of the governing Supreme Court precedent. Part V 
reviews the parties’ primary arguments. Part VI discusses the Court’s 
likely disposition of the limitations issue. 
 J.D. Candidate, 2011, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 08-974 (U.S. argued Feb. 22, 2010). 
 2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2003). 
 3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lewis, No. 08-974 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009). 
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II. FACTS 
On eleven occasions from 1996 to 2002, the City of Chicago (the 
“City”) made hiring decisions based on the results of a written test 
conducted in July 1995 for over 26,000 entry-level firefighter 
candidates.5 Forty-five percent of those candidates were white, and 37 
percent were black.6 In developing the test, the City hired expert for 
the express purpose of reducing the likelihood of the outcome having 
a disparate racial impact.7 The City graded the test on a 100-point 
scale and then placed each applicant into one of three categories 
based on his or her individual performance.8 Candidates who scored 
eighty-nine or above were considered “well qualified,” those who 
scored between sixty-five and eighty-eight were “qualified,” and those 
who scored below sixty-five were deemed “not qualified.”9 For 
operational and administrative reasons,10 the City implemented these 
categories despite the test developer’s objection to the eighty-nine 
cut-off score because of its arbitrariness and failure to reflect any 
distinction between the candidates’ firefighting abilities.11 Of the 1782 
“well qualified” applicants, 75.8 percent were white and 11.5 percent 
were black.12  
On January 26, 1996, the candidates were notified of their test 
scores, corresponding category placement, and the City’s intention to 
use these results for its hiring decisions.13 On the same day, the Mayor 
issued a press release announcing the results and the City’s plan to 
randomly select candidates from the “well qualified” category.14 As 
the City hired exclusively from this category for the next five years, 77 
percent of the entry-level firefighters were white, and nine percent 
were black.15 
The petitioners (“the applicants”) are a class of approximately 
6,000 black firefighters that were deemed “qualified,” based on the 
 5. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 3–4, Lewis, No. 08-974 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2009). 
 6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Lewis, No. 
08-974 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for the United States]. 
 7. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 2, Lewis, No. 08-974 (U.S. Apr. 10, 2009). 
 8. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 4. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 5 n.2. 
 11. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 11. 
 12. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 3. 
 13. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 5. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6. 
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written test results.16 The first charge was filed with the EEOC on 
March 31, 1997, more than one year after the initial announcement of 
the test results.17 On July 28, 1998, the EEOC issued the necessary 
right-to-sue letters to the applicants.18 The applicants filed suit in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on September 
9, 1998, alleging impermissible disparate impact.19 
The district court ruled in favor of the applicants.20 It held that the 
July 1995 test—specifically the “statistically meaningless” benchmark 
between the “qualified” and “well qualified” categories21—was not 
“job related for the position in question [nor] consistent with business 
necessity,”22 and had a disparate impact on the black applicants by 
disproportionately placing them in the “qualified” rather than the 
“well qualified” category.23 On appeal, the City did not refute the 
district court’s finding that the test violated Title VII’s disparate 
impact provisions.24 Instead, the City’s sole argument was that the 
district court erred because applicants’ suit was time-barred.25 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to make hiring 
decisions or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment . . . because of . . .  race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”26 In states with administrative agencies to remedy 
the employment practices proscribed by Title VII, the time period for 
injured plaintiffs to file their charges with the EEOC is 300 days after 
the unlawful act occurs; if there is no such agency, the plaintiff has 180 
days to file.27 Thereafter, if the EEOC or Attorney General does not 
file a civil action, the EEOC issues plaintiffs  “right to sue” letters 
allowing them to file suit against defendants within ninety days.28 
 16. Id. 
 17. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 5. 
 18. Id. at 6. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 7. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West 2003). 
 23. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 47 
(2009). 
 24. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 7–8. 
 25. Lewis, 528 F.3d at 490. 
 26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a). 
 27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (West 2003). 
 28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (The EEOC “shall so notify the person aggrieved and 
within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the 
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Supreme Court precedent establishes that two critical questions must 
be answered to determine when the statute of limitations begins to 
run: (1) does the conduct rise to the level of an unlawful employment 
practice and (2) when did that practice occur?29 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,30 the Supreme Court explained that 
Congress passed Title VII to remedy the consequences of all 
discriminatory hiring practices, whether intentional or not.31 The 
Court concluded that Title VII’s prohibition of illegitimate 
employment practices encompasses not only overt discrimination 
where intent is the defining element (disparate treatment), but also 
facially neutral practices that are “discriminatory in operation” 
(disparate impact).32 
The prohibition of disparate impact discrimination was codified 
twenty years later in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the “Act”).33 Under 
the Act, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of impermissible 
disparate impact by demonstrating that his employer “uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or nation origin,” and the employer 
then fails to satisfy his burden of “demonstrat[ing] that the challenged 
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.” Even if the employer successfully demonstrates 
that the practice is job related and consistent with business necessity, 
the plaintiff can still establish a prima facie case if the employer did 
not use feasible alternative practices with fewer discriminatory 
effects.34 
In its analysis in Lewis v. City of Chicago,35 the Seventh Circuit 
deemed especially relevant a line of Supreme Court cases that 
considered disparate treatment (rather than disparate impact) claims. 
These cases distinguished the violation itself from the violation’s 
continuing “adverse effects” for purposes of determining when the 
limitations period began to run.36 The inevitable consequences of the 
initial discriminatory act do not perpetually extend the statute of 
respondent named in the charge . . . .”). 
 29. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002). 
 30. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 31. Id. at 432. 
 32. Id. at 431. 
 33. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)). 
 34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 35. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 47 (2009). 
 36. Id. at 490. 
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limitations.37 But in cases where discrete discriminatory acts occur, 
each subsequent unlawful action is an independent violation.38 
Delaware State College v. Ricks39 was one of the first disparate 
treatment cases raising a limitations issue. In that case, a college 
intentionally discriminated against a professor when it denied him 
tenure on the basis of national origin.40 The professor filed his charge 
with the EEOC when he was terminated a year later pursuant to a 
one-year “terminal” contract, not when the school denied him 
tenure.41 The Supreme Court held that the filing period begins to run 
when the intentional act of employment discrimination takes place—
here, the denial of tenure, not when a later, but inevitable 
consequence of that original act occurs.42 Under this reasoning, the 
professor’s inevitable termination was simply an unfortunate effect of 
the earlier discriminatory act and did not constitute a “present 
violation.”43 
In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,44 the Supreme Court again 
considered a consequence of an intentionally discriminatory 
employment practice. Here, the intentionally discriminatory act was a 
change in the way seniority under a collective-bargaining agreement 
was calculated.45 Plaintiffs challenged the change four years after 
receiving demotions as a result of the new system.46 The Court noted 
that if the plaintiffs’ allegation were one of disparate impact where 
discriminatory intent is not an element, the charge-filing period would 
run from the time the impact was felt.47  But, as in disparate treatment 
cases, Title VII makes discriminatory intent a necessary element of 
claims challenging seniority systems.48 The Court concluded that the 
date the seniority system was modified governs the limitations period 
because the discriminatory effect of the facially nondiscriminatory 
 37. Id. 
 38. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)). 
 39. Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980). 
 40. Id. at 254. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 258. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 112 Stat. 1071, 1078–79 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West 2010)). 
 45. Id. at 900. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 908. 
 48. Id. at 904–05. 
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practice depended entirely upon the alleged illegality of the change to 
the system.49 Thus, the plaintiffs’ claim was untimely because it was 
based on intentionally discriminatory conduct that occurred outside 
the limitations period.50 In direct response to this decision, Congress 
amended Title VII’s seniority system provisions to allow applicants to 
file suit based on either the adoption or injurious application of an 
intentionally discriminatory seniority system.51 
Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed how the limitations 
period applies to Title VII claims in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co.52 In Ledbetter, a female employee brought a Title VII 
claim on the basis that her employer gave her intentionally 
discriminatory poor performance evaluations that resulted in lower 
pay raises than her male counterparts until the end of her career.53 In 
holding that the claim was time-barred, the Supreme Court 
determined that the use of a non-discriminatory pay structure does 
not give rise to a new Title VII claim simply because it furthers the 
long-term effects of an intentional discriminatory act that occurred 
outside the charging period.54 The Court emphasized, however, that 
an independent violation always commences a new tolling period 
regardless of its connection to other previous violations.55 
Interestingly, the Court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s claim could 
have succeeded under the Equal Pay Act, which, unlike Title VII, does 
not require proof of discriminatory intent.56 
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 200957 effectively overturned 
the Ledbetter holding. The Act amended Title VII’s discriminatory 
compensation provisions to expand the scope of employer liability.58 
 49. Id. at 911. 
 50. Id. at 908. 
 51. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 112 Stat. 1071, 1078–79 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) ( “[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with 
respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose 
in violation of this title (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of 
the seniority provision), when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes 
subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the 
seniority system or provision of the system.”). 
 52. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)). 
 53. Id. at 621–22. 
 54. Id. at 633. 
 55. Id. at 636. 
 56. Id. at 640. 
 57. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (West Supp. 
2009). 
 58. Id. 
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n 
or practice.  
began to run when the applicants were notified 
of t
the Supreme Court cases discussed above,  which held that the 
It allows an aggrieved employee to file suit when an employer adopts 
a discriminatory compensation decision or practice, when an 
employee becomes subjected to an existing discriminatory 
compensation decision or practice, or whenever the employee is 
affected by the application of a discriminatory compensation decisio
59
IV. HOLDING 
In determining whether the applicants’ suit in Lewis v. City of 
Chicago was time-barred, the Seventh Circuit found that neither the 
doctrine of continuing violation60 nor the doctrine of equitable tolling 
applied.61 The court concluded that the injury occurred and the 
statute of limitations started to toll when the city evaluated the 
plaintiffs’ eligibility on the basis of the test.62 The first applicant filed 
his charge 420 days after the City mailed the notices announcing the 
test results.63 The district court concluded the suit was timely because 
the claim was filed within 300 days of the time that the City first 
“used” the discriminatory practice by hiring applicants from the “well 
qualified” category.64 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the 
statute of limitations 
heir test results.65 
The court based its decision on appellate court precedent66 and 
67
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 47 
(2009) (“The doctrine of continuing violation allows you to delay suing until a series of acts by a 
prospective defendant blossoms into a wrongful injury on which a suit can be based. . . . Despite 
its name, it is a doctrine about cumulative rather than continuing violation. . . . Extension of the 
quitable tolling allows a plaintiff additional time within which to 
n diligent efforts on his part would not have enabled him to prepare and file his suit 
period.”). 
 121 F.3d 1047, 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Davidson v. Board of 
o
‘continuing violation’ doctrine in the manner urged by plaintiffs would have ludicrous 
consequences.”). 
 61. Id. (“The doctrine of e
sue . . . if eve
within the statutory 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 490. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 491. 
 66. Id. at 490–492 (citing Cox v. City of Memphis, 230 F.3d 199, 204–05 (6th Cir. 2000); 
Huels v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc.,
G vernors, 920 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1990)). But see Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 
87–88 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc)). 
 67. Id. at 490 (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), 
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–
6 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 
900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 112 Stat. 
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tolling period for a disparate treatment charge begins to run when the 
“discriminatory decision is made. . . rather than when it is executed.”68 
Invoking the Supreme Court’s holding in Delaware State College v. 
Ricks, the Seventh Circuit concluded that hiring only candidates who 
had scored in the “well qualified” category “was the automatic 
consequence of the test scores rather than the product[] of a fresh act 
of discrimination.”69 The Seventh Circuit rejected the applicants’ 
argument that the Supreme Court’s holding in Ricks applied only to 
disparate treatment cases by concluding that no fundamental 
difference exists between the two types of discrimination.70 
V. ARGUMENTS 
The crux of the applicants’ and the City’s dispute is whether an 
actionable claim accrued each time the City made hiring decisions 
based on the original results of the July 1995 examination.  Both sides 
rely on same line of Supreme Court cases to support their respective 
positions. The discussion below describes these arguments in turn. 
A. Petitioners’ Primary Arguments 
The applicants’ argument has three general facets.  First, both Title 
VII and Supreme Court precedent point to differing accrual periods 
for disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.  Second, practical 
considerations confirm the logic of making this distinction.  Third, the 
evidentiary concerns supporting a more limited tolling period for 
disparate treatment claims do not exist in disparate impact cases. 
1. First, the applicants argue that each use of a discriminatory 
written examination in the City’s hiring practice is actionable under 
Title VII.71 This argument rests primarily upon the remedial aim and 
plain meaning of Title VII’s disparate impact and charge-filing 
provisions.72 As long as all the required elements independently exist, 
they claim, a Title VII claim commences a new charge-filing period 
1071, 1078–79 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2));Delaware State College v. 
ations, rather than an effect or consequence of a past act of intentional 
is, 528 F.3d at 491. 
tioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15. 
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)). These cases held that for a Title VII disparate treatment charge to 
be timely, a plaintiff must identify an act of intentional discrimination within the statutory 
period of limit
discrimination. 
 68. Id. at 490. 
 69. Lew
 70. Id. 
 71. Peti
 72. Id. 
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 Title VII and has been consistently honored by 
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even if it is related to a prior violation.73 The applicants stress the 
Supreme Court’s repeated conclusion that an actionable “claim 
accrues when all elements of a Title VII violation are present.”74 
Accordingly, the applicants assert they timely filed their claim because 
all of the elements of a Title VII violation were present each time they 
were passed over for employment.75 Title VII expressly proscribes all 
employment actions, including hiring decisions, which have an 
impermissible disparate impact on a protected class.76 Here, the 
applicants argue, the City’s use of the hiring selection process 
constituted an independent violation of Title VII, regardless of how 
much tim
ults.77 
Supreme Court precedent has emphasized that a disparate 
treatment claim is complete when an employer has adopted or 
announced an intentionally discriminatory practice, not when the 
plaintiff suffered a later consequence of that act.78 Conversely, in a 
disparate impact case, where intent is not an element, a claim accrues 
when “that impact is felt.”79 Although the Seventh Circuit regarded 
the distinction between the two types of claims as “not 
fundamental,”80 the applicants insist that this distinction in accrual 
periods is embodied in
 Supreme Court.81 
Because of these differing elements in disparate treatment and 
disparate impact cases, the applicants argue the Seventh Circuit 
should not have relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Delaware 
State College v. Ricks.82 Ricks was a Title VII disparate treatment case 
that did not address the timeliness of claims in disparate impact 
cases.83 The Supreme Court rejected the claims in Ricks, Lorance v. 
AT&T Technologies, Inc., and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
 73. Id. 
 74. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15. 
 75. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 23. 
 76. Id. at 24 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(2), (k)(1)(A)). 
 77. Id. at 28. 
 78. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15. 
 79. Id. (quoting Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 908 (1989), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 112 Stat. 1071, 1078–79 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2)). 
 80. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 47 
(2009). 
 81. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 22. 
 82. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 38. 
 83. Id. 
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intent is irrelevant to the limitations period, which begins to 
run
cted by the practices application, or, when a 
concrete injury occurs and the discriminatory impact is felt, the tolling 
period has expired.91 
Co., not because they stemmed from earlier violations, but because 
they failed to allege an intentionally discriminatory act during the 
limitations period.84 In contrast, discriminatory intent is not an 
element of the disparate impact claim in Lewis.85 Thus, the existence 
of such 
 only when the challenged practice produces a discriminatory 
effect.86 
2. As a practical matter, the accrual rule advocated by the 
applicants makes sense because once employees realize they have 
suffered injury due to the disparate impact of an employment practice 
they have every reason to file promptly since their interests lie in 
attaining the employment opportunities that they were allegedly 
denied.87 On the other hand, the rule espoused by the Seventh Circuit 
would encourage plaintiffs to file disparate impact charges before 
they are sure of “whether and how” test results will be used; that is, 
before all the facts needed to prove a disparate impact claim have 
“crystallized” and before there is any certainty that the results of an 
illegitimate test will actually be used and have practical 
consequences.88 For example, employers often use test scores to rank 
candidates to make hiring decisions over time “with individuals often 
unable to predict when, if ever they might be provided or denied job 
opportunities based on those ranking.”89 Therefore, the Seventh 
Circuit’s application of Title VII’s charge-filing provisions perversely 
incentivizes individuals to file suit in order not to “forever lose their 
right to do so,” even if no practical consequences have materialized.90 
Under the Seventh Circuit rule, aggrieved employees may face a lose-
lose situation when a practice’s adverse impact is not immediately 
apparent: they either do not have standing because they have not yet 
been adversely impa
 
 84. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 22. 
ule . . . fails to address the 
a sequences of an employer’s creation of an eligibility list based rank-order or 
 id. at 17 (explaining that in non-testing contexts, even when a practice’s adverse 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 29. 
 88. Id. at 31–33. 
 89. Brief of the National Partnership for Women & Families and the National Women's 
Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11, Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 
08-974 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) (explaining that “the Seventh Circuit’s r
re lity that the con
cut-off scores are often far from clear at the time of its adoption”). 
 90. Id. at 13. 
 91. See
2010] LEWIS V. CITY OF CHICAGO 143 
As noted by the Solicitor General, if the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision is affirmed, the Court would essentially condone an 
employer’s use of implicitly unlawful selection criteria as long as no 
one filed a charge within 300 days after the test results were 
announced.92 Such an interpretation, the Solicitor General warned, 
would cut against the very purpose of Title VII—”remov[ing] 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or 
other impermissible classification.”93 
The International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies 
(“IAOHRA”) filed an amicus brief in favor of the applicants making 
additional arguments regarding the practical implications of the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision.94 Based on their extensive experience in 
processing employment discrimination charges,95 IAOHRA argued 
that a widespread application of the Seventh Circuit’s rule would 
place additional burdens on the EEOC and local Fair Employment 
Practices Agencies, which already face the largest caseload in history, 
due to the increase in volume of charges filed.96 Potential 
discrimination claims could be resolved if workers could wait to see if 
employers hired in a discriminatory fashion as opposed to potential 
litigants simply filing due to the pressures imposed by an accrual rule 
limited to the announcement of a hiring practice.97 
3. Finally, the applicants contended that the legitimate evidentiary 
concerns existing in disparate treatment cases are not applicable to 
disparate impact cases.98 Because evidence of mental culpability is not 
needed to prove a claim of disparate impact, the pertinent evidence, 
typically “focus[ing] on statistical disparities, rather than specific 
incidents,” is not weakened or lost as time passes.99 Thus, the 
resolution of the merits of a disparate impact case are not 
 
impact is immediately apparent, courts have focused on the practice’s impact rather than its 
adoption). 
 92. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 31. 
 93. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 94. Brief for Amicus Curiae International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies 
in Support of Petitioners at 2, Lewis, No. 08-974 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for 
IAOHRA]. The IAOHRA represents Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) who 
share administrative responsibilities with the EEOC. Among the responsibilities of IAOHRA is 
determining the timeliness of discrimination charges. 
 95. Id. at 1. 
 96. Id. at 14. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 30 (explaining that the passage of time does 
not raise the same concerns in disparate impact cases as it does in disparate treatment cases). 
 99. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)). 
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 would warrant an employer’s 
invocation of the laches defense.101 
B. Respondent’s Primary 
nt or impact) was committed and no 
add
 
compromised by allowing employees to recover whenever they are 
injured by the use of an unlawful practice, even if this occurs years 
after its implementation.100 Any unreasonable or prejudicial delay by 
an employee in filing a charge
Arguments 
The thrust of the City’s argument was that the Seventh Circuit was 
correct in holding that no new violations occurred after the adoption 
and announcement of the invalid list.102  Instead, the applicants only 
experienced “predictable consequences of [that] prior discriminatory 
act.”103 The City conceded that the applicants successfully proved that 
using the test results to create the eligibility list had an unlawful 
disparate racial impact, but not that the consequent hiring of 
applicants who fell in the well qualified category had any further 
disparate impact.104 Highlighting the Supreme Court’s holdings 
confirming that Title VII claims accrue when the unlawful discrete act, 
not a present effect of that act, occurs,105 the City maintained that only 
the initial test score classification injured the applicants and 
commenced the limitations period.106 In using the list, no additional 
act of discrimination (in treatme
itional injury was suffered.107 
The City also pointed out that when Congress has disagreed with 
Supreme Court rulings, it has amended Title VII’s file-charging 
provisions.108  The specific amendments following the Lorance and 
Ledbetter decisions are not implicated by the applicants’ claim, 
leaving the Court’s reasoning in these cases entirely applicable.109 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s “discrete act” accrual rule should extend 
to both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims because 
nothing in Title VII indicates any reason for applying different rules.110 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 29. 
 102. Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 10, Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 
08-974 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2009). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 8 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(2), 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)). 
 105. Id. at 6. 
 106. Id. (quoting Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257–58 (1980)). 
 107. Id. at 7. 
 108. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 18 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
5(e)(2), 2000e-(e)(3)(A)). 
 109. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 13 n.3. 
 110. Id. at 17. 
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 proven with “direct 
evi
rests of employers and 
oth
 the time to meet the tolling deadline but 
simply chose to wait.119 
 
Under this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit determined that the same 
rule applied to the applicants’ case because Title VII distinguishes 
disparate treatment and disparate impact only as methods of proving 
discrimination claims, not “types of discriminatory acts in and of 
themselves.”111 The City argued that there would be no justification in 
extending the filing period for disparate impact claims that are proven 
with circumstantial evidence while maintaining the limited filing 
period for disparate treatment cases that are
dence of discrimination.”112 
In response to the applicants’ argument that the broad remedial 
purpose of Title VII is inconsistent with a relatively short limitations 
period, the City emphasized that applicants failed to acknowledge 
that Title VII’s intentionally brief filing periods also exist to protect 
employers’ reasonable reliance and repose interests.113 Congress 
expressly opted for a short filing period rather than a longer one.114 
This intentionally brief period reflects the “delicate balance” between 
protecting the civil rights of employees who promptly seek redress 
and employers from stale claims.115 A short statute of limitations 
allows agencies or the courts to resolve claims when “memories are 
clear; the harm is limited; and reliance inte
er employees have not yet crystallized.”116 
The City dismissed the applicants’ “unfounded” fear that a 
restrictive filing period may “immunize” employers because eligibility 
lists are only used until a subsequent examination is administered and 
any instance of present discrimination will always give rise to another 
claim.117 In contrast, a liberal filing period would present employers 
with an uncertain period of liability and frustrate the reasonable 
reliance interests of both employers and other employees in regard to 
implemented practices.118 Regardless, the City insists that applicants’ 
arguments for a broad accrual rule for disparate impact cases are 
undermined by the fact that every applicant was aware of an 
actionable claim within
 111. Id. 
 112. Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 102, at 8. 
 113. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 19–20. 
 114. Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 102, at 10–11. 
 115. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 19–20. 
 116. Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 102, at 10–11. 
 117. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 20. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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VI. LIKELY DISPOSITION 
This case calls upon the Supreme Court to apply its Title VII 
statute of limitations precedent in the “slightly different context”120 of 
testing practices with an unlawful disparate impact. The Court likely 
will conclude that the accrual rules for disparate impact and disparate 
treatment claims differ. The Court will therefore overturn the Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling because the ruling disregarded important distinctions 
between the elements of disparate impact and disparate treatment 
claims.121 The Court has made clear that disparate treatment claims 
accrue upon notice of an intentionally discriminatory employment 
practice and not upon the occurrence of its effects because intent is an 
essential element of such a claim. 122 Hence, to delay the running of 
the limitations period for a disparate treatment charge until an 
eventual consequence of an act of intentional discrimination would be 
to ignore the defining element of the legal claim serving as the basis 
for a plaintiff’s Title VII recovery
The factors leading to the Court’s rejection of certain disparate 
treatment claims as time-barred—lack of the requisite elements, risk 
of staleness, and the ability to identify instances of intentional 
discrimination when they occur—do not apply to the applicants’ 
disparate impact charge. As the applicants emphasize, all the requisite 
elements of a disparate impact claim exist in their charge based on the 
use of an illegitimate test.124 Hence, “each round of hiring only 
applicants who scored 89 or above on the test constituted a 
freestanding, present violation of Title VII’s disparate impact 
prohibition that started a new and distinct charge-filing period.”125 
Further, by limiting the tolling period to the announcement of a 
discriminatory practice, the Court would require plaintiffs to file 
charges before a discriminatory impact has come to fruition, e.g., 
before there is any certainty about the gravity of an injury, if one will 
 120. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621. 
 121. See Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 22 (“Unlike intentional discrimination 
claims . . . the ‘defining element’ of a disparate impact claim is the effect of an employment 
practice on members of a protected group, rather than the employer’s intent in adopting the 
practice.”). 
 122. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (citing Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 355 n.15 (1977)); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988) 
(“Disparate-treatment cases present ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination’. . . . A 
disparate-treatment plaintiff must establish ‘that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or 
motive’ for taking a job-related action.”). 
 123. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 624. 
 124. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15. 
 125. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
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even occur.126 
The applicants’ arguments are consistent with the plain language 
of Title VII, which the Court has declared as authoritative in its 
analysis absent any ambiguity.127 Title VII specifically prohibits an 
employer from using “a particular employment practice that causes a 
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin . . . .”128 The parties’ submissions make clear that the City’s 
hiring selections on the basis of the test results were “uses” of a 
concededly illegitimate test.129 And, as the applicants emphasize, 
neither the language of Title VII nor Supreme Court precedent 
indicates that an employment practice can be challenged only at the 
time of its promulgation, and no later.130 If all the requisite elements 
of a disparate treatment or disparate impact case are present, a fresh 
claim of the occurrence of an unlawful employment practice accrues, 
and an EEOC charge is viable within 180 or 300 days of that time.131 
Further, given Title VII’s goal of eliminating discrimination in the 
workplace, it would be contrary to legislative intent to construe the 
period of limitations so narrowly as to bar employees from redress 
simply because they chose to wait for a concrete injury to fully 
materialize rather than preemptively challenge a seemingly 
discriminatory hiring practice.132 The Seventh Circuit’s decision is ripe 
for reversal by the Supreme Court because it failed to look to the 
statutory language of Title VII itself, and instead relied only upon 
cases that were factually and theoretically distinct from the 
applicants’ disparate impact claim. 
 126. Brief for IAOHRA, supra note 94, at 10. 
 127. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 498 U.S. 235, 241(1989) (The starting point of 
the Supreme Court’s analysis is “the language of the statute itself.” Where “the statute’s 
language is plain” that is “where inquiry should end” because “the sole function of the courts is 
to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.”) 
 128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West 2003). 
 129. Both petitioners’ and respondent’s phrasing of the “Question Presented” expressly 
refer to the City’s “use” of the discriminatory test results. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 4, at i (“Where an employer adopts an employment practice that discriminates 
against African Americans in violation of Title VII's disparate impact provision, must a plaintiff 
file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the announcement of the practice, or may a plaintiff 
file a charge within 300 days after the employer's use of the discriminatory practice?”) (emphasis 
added); see also Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at i (“Whether the limitations 
period on a Title VII claim for disparate impact from an examination and eligibility list . . . starts 
to run only when the list is adopted and announced, or also later, upon each use of the same 
list.”) (emphasis added). 
 130. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15. 
 131. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 28. 
 132. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[R]emedial legislation should be 
construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.”). 
